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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates empirically how different dimensions of decentralization interact to influence 
governance performance of sub-central governments in a unitary state. As specified in many other 
studies, decentralization is a multi-dimensional institutional reform. Treisman (2002a), for example, 
supposes that decentralization in the public sector differs in the number of tiers of government, the 
degree  of  decision-making  autonomy,  resources  (revenue  power  and  manpower),  democracy,  and 
constitutional  participation.  His  study  of  154  countries  shows  those  with  a  higher  degree  of 
decentralization,  especially  those  with  more  government  layers,  have  poorer  performance  in  the 
delivery of basic public services and worse corruption. However, he fails to check its robustness, and 
other  dimensions  of  political  decentralization  have  an  inconclusive  effect  on  the  quality  of 
government. In this paper, we distinguish formal decentralization – or the legitimate level of human 
resource management autonomy assigned by the central government to sub-central governments - 
from the informal one which is the actual level of decision-making power of the later shaped by 
‘village’ culture and persistent for centuries beyond the control of the former
§.  
The distinction between formal decentralization and informal decentralization has been discussed by 
several authors (Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995, Jones-Luong 2003, Malesky 2004, Shah and 
Thomson 2004), and it can also be abstracted from a good number of theoretical and case studies on 
formal and informal institutions (North, 1990, Stigliz 2000, Taylor 1992, Dia 1996, Aghion and Tirole 
1997, Voigt and Kiwit 1998, Zenger et al. 2001, Dixit 2003, Helmke and Levitsky 2004, Tsai 2002). 
Most  of  them  argue  that  mechanisms  of  power  creation  are  not  the  same,  but  endogenously 
determined. Formal decentralization refers to the assignment of decision rights over certain public 
policies from the upper tier of government to the lower one. Due to coordination failures along the 
tiers  of  government  (e.g.,  information  asymmetry,  contract  incompleteness,  interest  conflicts,  or 
capability  and  resource  constraints),  decentralization  is,  by  nature,  partial  in  reality.  Bureaucrats 
always  have  incentives  to  create  or  at  least  facilitate  the  establishment  of  a  private  order  to 
complement, substitute, accommodate, or compete with malfunctioning systems of public order for the 
sake of their community or simply in sought of maximizing their private benefits given rights limit. 
This private order allows lower-tier governments to exercise higher-tier rules and regulations at their 
discretion and even to introduce their own rules acknowledged and respected by citizens in their 
community at low fixed costs (Li 2003). When the private order is rooted from culture and history, it 
may gain even faster and stronger consensus within the community and acts as an umbrella over a 
substantial degree of ‘informal’ local autonomy beyond their authority. The upper tier recognizes this 
kind of inflated behavior at lower tiers and restrains it by allocating vertically a limited number of 
decision rights in certain public areas where a private order enables to maximize utilities of local 
                                                           
§ We focus on the legitimacy of decentralization, which is different from its functional dimensions as classified 
by other authors (Oates 1972, Treisman 2002a, Yilmaz and Ebel 2002, Rodden 2004) or from its structural 
aspects  (i.e.,  de  jure  and  de  facto  decentralization  as  in  King  and  Özler  1998).  In  our  paper,  formal 
decentralization is defined as the degree of control power officially allocated to sub-central governments by the 
upper and implemented as assigned while informality implies the scope of discrete decision-making at the sub-
central level which is not allowed or encouraged by the upper. Although our analysis can be extended to other 
types  of  decentralization,  the  high  correlation  among  most  of  them  restrains  us  from  obtaining  unbiased 
predictions of their complementary or substitute relationships in our estimations for a system of simultaneous 
equations. 3 | P a g e  
 
government  officials  while  creating  incentives  for  them  to  provide  high-quality  public  order  and 
public goods and services cost-efficiently
**.  
Political literature has identified four patterns of interaction between informal institutions and formal 
institutions:  complementary,  substitutive,  accommodating,  and  competing  (Voigt  and  Kiwit  1998, 
Helmke and Levitsky 2004
††). The two systems are complementary when informal institutions share 
the common  goals with effective formal institutions and create incentives to facilitate the latter’s 
enforcement. Their relationship becomes substitutive when existing formal institutions are ineffective, 
and hence informal institutions are created ad hoc to achieve the goal that fails to achieve formally. In 
the first two cases, outcomes are similar and cooperative. Helmke and Levitsky also list two other 
understudied types of the relationship when informal institutions may not pursue the goal of formal 
institutions. In certain circumstances, the actors do not like the status quo of the latter and attempt to 
create  an  informal  set  of  rules  to  solve  their  problems  more  effectively.  Informal  rules  do  not 
necessarily directly violate the formal ones, but find ways around the latter to pursue their own goals. 
If it is the case, informal institutions are called to be accommodating with formal ones. Informal 
institutions also can dominate weak formal institutions and may drive the actors to ignore and violate 
them.  The  two  systems  now  become  competing  and  dysfunctional.  The  later  cases  show  non-
cooperative behavior and divergent outcomes of formal and informal institutions. Which types of the 
interrelationship  do  formal  decentralization  and  informal  decentralization  belong  to  in  the  above 
typology?  And  how  do  they  influence  the  governance  performance  of  government  and  economic 
growth? 
There are three main mechanisms through which decentralization impacts government performance. 
First,  decentralization  affects  behavior  and  efforts  of  local  government  officials  through  local 
democracy. Accordingly, local voters have a deterministic say for the chance of staying in office in the 
re-election  through  their  perceptions  of  the  quality  of  government  in  the  first  term.  So,  local 
government officials stand at the trade-off between diverting rents from tax revenue and winning the 
re-election (Seabright 1996, Persson and Tabellini 2000, and Hindriks and Lockwood 2005). Second, 
decentralization  also  influences  government  performance  through  interjurisdictional  competition 
between  sub-national  governments.  Tiebout  (1956)  claims  that  under  decentralization  and 
interjurisdictional competition, the voters can vote for the bundle of public goods and taxes they 
prefer, so given the low cost of mobility, they will vote out to the local government that matches their 
preferences.  Brenan  and  Buchanan  (1980)  extend  Tiebout’s  theory  and  argue  that  under  factor 
mobility, governments can compete with one another to attract them, which eliminate the monopoly 
power over local regulations and restrain their opportunistic behavior. From a different perspective, 
Salmon  (1987)  and  Besley  and  Smart  (2007)  emphasize  the  advantage  of  decentralization  as  a 
mechanism  of  yardstick  competition;  voters  can  make  inference  of  their  own  local  government 
performance by comparing with their neighboring jurisdictions of similar conditions. Third, under 
decentralization, local governments are supposedly more likely to be captured by ‘elites’ and can lead 
to more distortions of policy choice and give rise to overspending incentives. However, we argue that 
one of hardly-mentioned channels is to formally honor their identity of a small ‘president’ in the 
                                                           
** We measure the performance of local governments through the clients’ satisfaction about the quality of public 
order provision and public service delivery.  
†† Voigt and Kiwit’s typology of formal and informal institutions is based on whether they regulate the same or 
different types of human behavior (or functionalist perspective). Helmke and Levisky emphasize the sharing goal 
(cooperative  or  non-cooperative)  of  the  two  types  of  institutions  and  the  status  quo  of  formal  institutions 
(efficient or inefficient). Our conceptualization is closer to Helmke and Levisky’s.  4 | P a g e  
 
community under their authority. This is really an important aspect in those countries that the ‘village’ 
culture, or the kind of common wisdom of ‘King’s laws are held back at the gate of the village’, 
prevails and dominates how rules are made and implemented like in Vietnam. 
How does the interplay between formal and informal institutions mean for economic growth? Both 
theoretical and empirical studies have been exhausted in finding the answer and it turns out to depend 
on their strength, local preference for each type of rules, and the extent of their goal convergence 
during their evolution and development (North 1990, Voigt 1993, Pejovich 1999, Keefer and Shirley 
2000, de Soto 2000, Acemoglu, et al. 2001). They agree that the same rule may not have the similar 
impact on all economies because of heterogeneous enforcement mechanisms and preferences. For 
example, Knack (1995) found that property right protection institutions are determinant of economic 
growth. However, Keefer and Shirley (2000) and Williamson (2009) argue that formal institutions are 
not  sufficient  to  maintain  economic  growth,  but  should  be  embedded  in  informal  institutions.  In 
general,  empirical  evidence  shows  cooperation  (complementary  or  substitute  relationship  between 
institutions) is critical to economic growth, and the real impact is sensitive to their definition and 
measurement.  
So  far,  empirical  research  on  the  interaction  between  formal  decentralization  and  informal 
decentralization has been restricted, partly due to difficulties in quantifying informal aspects. The 
outcomes of their interrelationship are sensitive to particular dimensions of decentralization and the 
mechanisms they evolve. If formal decentralization is used as an instrument of the upper government 
to provide incentives for lower-level policy innovation, it may lead to an increase in the level of local 
autonomy. This happens when local government officials attach a high value to their identity as a 
‘president’ in their locality, even more than their private rents. As the value of identity is partially 
linked to the official degree of autonomy, the organizational design of the formal system affects their 
effort distribution to alternative tasks (for example, between the provision of public order and delivery 
of public goods and services) given the self-assessed value of their identity.  
If informal decentralization institutions are created ad hoc in order to accommodate undesired or to 
compete with or to substitute weak formal institutions, the outcome may be or may be not efficiency-
enhancing. For example, the local ‘jockeying’ over forest resources in Indonesia has resulted in the 
loss of state control and power over this property and the unorganized exploitation of timbers under 
the implicit consensus of local governments (Ravenel 2004). In China, the Organic Law of Village 
Committees assigned village committees the responsibility to provide certain infrastructural services 
to their villagers, but Tsai (2002) found that those villages (among four studied cases) use local social 
networks such as temples to raise resources and self-finance local spending on certain public services 
provide more of them compared to those relying on village officials. However, this kind of informal 
system of providing public goods and services is not sustainable and only applicable to small-scale 
transaction  and  in  small  community.  Informally  decentralized  institutions  and  procedures  can  be 
quickly destabilized by the introduction and change of more effective formal ones (Stigliz 2000, Dixit 
2004). In this case, informal decentralization may have to adhere to formal one if it does not want to 
be suppressed.  
Comparing the two systems, Gambetta (1993), Li (2003), and Dixit (2004) found that informal system 
is less  successful  in  protecting  property  rights than  in enforcing  the  contracts  because  it requires 
minimal public order. Montinola et al. (1995) argues that when the sub-central government acts as a 
‘small’  national  government,  the  autonomy  they  obtain  under  decentralization  may  make  their 5 | P a g e  
 
commitment incredible. This is due to the higher possibility of ‘elite’ capture at the lower layers of 
government (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Therefore, the multi-tier 
government structure may not induce the enhancement of governance performance at the local level. 
Formal and informal decentralization institutions may also have divergent outcome if the former faces 
constraints (i.e., in financial or human resources, or technology change) while informal institutions 
have channels to ease these constraints, through the inflow of the FDI, for instance, or simply thanks 
to its fixed cost advantage. It is obvious that studies on the interplay between formal and informal 
decentralization  also  support  the  general  view  of  most  scholar  on  the  interaction  of  formal  and 
informal institutions: whether they are complementary, substitutive, accommodating, or competing 
depends on the strength of the existing formal system and the local preference for each institutional 
system; and their impact on governance and economic performance depends on the strength of each 
system against the other and the degree of their sharing goals. 
Our paper has original distinctions from the others in four points. First, it is an empirical study across 
64 Vietnamese provinces over the period of 2006-2008 (20 years since it embarked the ‘Doi Moi’ or 
Renovation). Vietnam is chosen because it is typical of a country where the formally decentralized 
system is still immature and where the degree of formal decentralization varies across provinces due to 
the non-uniform decentralization scheme of the government, and where local order prevails and shapes 
the way government officials make and implement policies. The mechanism of establishing such a 
private  order  is  through  fence-breaking,  or  violating  central  laws  and  issuing  local  rules  to 
accommodate  or  substitute  the  former.  In  addition,  2006  is  the  first  year  that  the  Provincial 
Competitiveness Index, measuring the governance performance of all 64 provincial governments, was 
launched. This is the main source of data for us to evaluate the quality of sub-central governments in 
our  paper.  The  methodology  of  the  survey  was  stable  during  this  period,  allowing  us  to  obtain 
relatively consistent measurement. This is also the year the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CCCP), for the 2006-2010 terms, was elected and presented with representatives of 
provincial government leadership. The ratio of provincial representation in CCCP is controlled for in 
our study  of the  impact  of  decentralization  on  government  quality. The  2006-2008  period allows 
sufficient lagged time to evaluate institutional settings in a stable manner after almost provinces were 
involved in gerrymandering from 1990 to 2004. This is also the period that provincial governments 
were given substantial discretions in making public policies (for example, regarding public spending, 
land management, human resource management, and law-making) and that provincial governments are 
very proactive and innovative in sought of ways to improve their performance and ease their hard 
budget  constraints  under  the  increasing  pressure  of  local  democracy  and  interjurisdictional 
competition for resources, especially private capital and high-quality laborers.  
Second,  our  informal  decentralization  measure  is  constructed,  using  the  result  of  the  Vietnam 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) 2006-2008 survey, asking over 7000 private firms of whether 
provincial governments where they are domiciled are flexible, creative, and breaking the fence in the 
implementation of central laws. Our concept of informal decentralization is similar to that of Torgler 
and Schneider (2009) who found the positive effect of local autonomy on tax compliance of Swiss 
citizens and the narrowing size of the unofficial economy. Third, the outcomes of formal and informal 
decentralization  are  compared  by  estimating  their  impact  on  some  indicators  of  government 
performance in public order provision (including property right protection, legal enforcement, legal 
predictability and corruption) and public goods and service provision (public services for the private 
sector and infrastructure quality). Most of them are the results of the PCI Vietnam surveys from 2006 
to 2008. Finally, we contribute to the lack of empirical research on informal decentralization and on 6 | P a g e  
 
the  interaction  between  formal  and  informal  decentralization  in  impacting  the  efficiency  of  the 
government under a homogenous institutional setting. We found that what matter much the variation 
in  the  government  performance  in  cross-country  studies  such  as  legal  origins  or  religion  seem 
unimportant in within-country analysis and in a country of small religious population like Vietnam. 
We claim that the dynamic incentive structure created from the interrelationship between different 
dimensions of decentralization is critical to the quality of lower-level governments. 
The  main  findings  of  this  paper  are  that  formal  decentralization  is  accommodating  informal 
decentralization  in  the  delivery  of  public  goods  and  services  and  is  competing  with  formal 
decentralization in the provision of public order. This suggests that the formally decentralized system 
of  supplying  public  goods  and  services  give  sufficient  incentives  to  lower-layer  governments  to 
perform  efficiently,  but  it  is  still  lack  of  effectiveness  in  the  provision  of  strong  public  order, 
particularly the protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and reduction in corruption. 
Therefore, the emergence of and dependence on informal decentralized system co-existing with formal 
system  are  necessary  to  obtain  satisfaction  over  public  goods/services  and  order,  at  least  until  a 
formally decentralized system is effective enough to compete successfully with the informal partner in 
the provision of public order and other goods and services. In the next stage of reform, what central 
government needs to consider is to improve formal procedures and reset a more appropriate degree of 
formal  decentralization  that  give  sufficient  incentives  for  local  governments  in  maintaining  and 
enhancing the public satisfaction over their performance. We also find the negative and significant 
impact  of  the  non-cooperative  relationship  between  decentralization  institutions,  specifically  the 
formal institution on economic  growth. This requires reform efforts should focus on relaxing the 
limited autonomy of local governments in human resource management (quota
‡‡) and allowing more 
discretion in their making decisions over the number, structure, and wage schemes of employees under 
their management. These findings are the results of employing the three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
model and then robustly checked with OLS model.  
The following section gives a review of literature on the interaction between formal and informal 
system of decentralization and its effect on local government performance. Section 3 describes how 
formal  and  informal  decentralization  works  in  Vietnam.  A  description  of  data  and  models  with 
discussion of results will be provided in section 4. Finally, the paper ends with conclusions. 
2. FORMAL AND INFORMAL DECENTRALIZATION – THE CASE OF VIETNAM 
The assessment of the relationship between formal and informal decentralization and government 
efficiency  should  be  a  country-specific  issue,  taking  into  account  the  heterogeneity  of  political, 
cultural, and economic conditions of each geographical unit of analysis. There is no “one size to fit 
all” institutions for all countries and hence institutions will put different constraints and incentives for 
government performance and imply dissimilar outcomes across regions and countries. In this section, 
we  will  study  the  case of  how  decentralization  works  in  Vietnam,  and  how  formal  and informal 
decentralization interacts to impact the quality of sub-central (provincial) governments. 
                                                           
‡‡ The Decree number 71/2003/ND-CP issued on 19 June 2003 by the Government on the decentralization of 
human  resource  management  in  the  state  sector  allowed  sub-central  governments  certain  discretions  in 
recruitment, dismissal, and transfer of their employees, but the annual number of employees in the state sector 
must be complied with the quota and norms of the central government agencies. Therefore, our measure of 
formal decentralization as the percentage of provincial employment in the state sector in the total central and 
sub-central government employment is a formal rule in its true sense. 7 | P a g e  
 
2.1. Formal decentralization 
By law, Vietnam is a politically centralized government organized into four levels. Until May 2008, 
the country has 64 provinces, 690 districts, and 11055 communes
§§. Since economic reform, or the 
‘Doi Moi’, was initiated in the 1990s, decentralization has been going on in the areas of fiscal, public 
administration and regulations to a greater extent. In this process, the central government has assigned 
a  certain  degree  of  decision-making  authority  to  sub-central  governments.  The  power,  roles,  and 
responsibilities of state and sub-state governments are set out in the legislation, including Law on 
Local  Governments  enacted  in  1958,  Law  on  Organization  of  the  People’s  Council  and  the 
Administrative Committees at All Levels of Government in 1994, the Ordinance on Concrete Tasks in 
1996, Law on the State Budget in 1998, the Revised Law on the State Budget in 2003, and Law on the 
Issuance of Legal Documents by the People’s Council and People’s Committee in 2004. In Vietnam, 
the  key  sub-central  government  is  provinces  with  major  responsibilities  being  devolved  to  this 
intermediate level rather than local units (communes/villages). Therefore, provincial governments are 
the focus of this paper. 
Different  from  many  other  countries,  decentralization  is  an  institutional  reform  from  the  top  in 
Vietnam. The degree of decentralization is, to a great extent, determined by the central government. 
The central government prescribes the powers and responsibilities of sub-central governments. Take 
fiscal decentralization as an example. Law on the State Budget of 1996 and the Revised Law on the 
State Budget of 2003 make a list of expenditure responsibilities assigned to both central government 
and sub-central governments. In 2002, the share of sub-central government expenditures in the total 
government expenditure is 48% (World Bank 2005). This figure suggests Vietnam be a relatively 
highly decentralized country in terms of public spending. The central government also stipulates in the 
Budget Law what kinds of taxes and fees (i.e., VAT on import goods, export tax, import tax, special 
consumption tax on import goods) are fully assigned to the central budget, what kinds (i.e., land and 
housing taxes, license tax, fee on land use, and others) are fully charged and collected by the sub-
central governments, and what kinds (VAT except that on import goods, corporate income tax, tax on 
remittance, excise tax on domestic goods and services, gasoline and oil fees and personal income tax)  
are shared between the central budget and the local budget. The degree of revenue decentralization is 
distinct across provinces, subjected to the amount of transfers from the central government to SNGs, 
the revenue from taxes and fees made in their locality, and the sharing tax rate. In Vietnam, the sharing 
tax rate
*** is the same for all shared taxes, but it differs by province (Martinez-Vazquez 2005). In 
2004, the sharing rate is 100% for 47 poorest provinces and other 17 provinces share a part of their 
revenue with the central government
†††. The sharing rates may be subjected to change annually and 
non-uniform sharing rates across provinces are used for equalization purpose. This makes Vietnam 
different from many other countries which maintain a uniform system of sharing rates and rely on the 
transfer system to achieve equalization targets. The non-uniform system of sharing tax rates across 
provinces also leaves a room for local officials to make efforts to enhance revenue capacity of their 
local government.  
                                                           
§§ The data is available on the website of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam at www.gso.gov.vn. 
*** The sharing tax rate is determined by a formula of the Ministry of Finance considering the difference between 
spending needs and revenue capacity. The former is estimated on the basis of norms and can be negotiated ex 
ante while the later is estimated on the basis of past revenue. 
††† Extracted from the balance sheet of state government budget and local government budget for the year 2004 
disclosed by the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam.  8 | P a g e  
 
Since 1998, provincial governments are empowered to manage their own state officials, including 
recruitment, appointment, training, and firing. The percentage of government officials under provincial 
management in the total government staff is approximately 54% on average over the 2000-2008 period 
(General Statistics Office of Vietnam). This figure also shows Vietnam has decentralized relatively 
strongly  in  state  human  resource  management,  and  the  degree  of  decentralization  in  this  area  is 
equivalent to that in public spending. Similar to other research, decentralization in human resource 
management  and  in  fiscal  area  is  highly  correlated  (0.82  between  the  former  with  revenue 
decentralization  and  0.91  with  expenditure  decentralization).  However,  state  employment 
decentralization has insignificant correlation with transfer (0.07)
‡‡‡.  
2.2. Informal decentralization 
Although local government autonomy has not been acknowledged in the constitution, it is substantial 
in practice. Malesky (2008) has described acts of autonomy of local governments regarding their 
policy experimentation or innovations where regulations do not exist as ‘fence-breaking’ or informal 
decentralization
§§§ . From the perspective of the central government, all of these initiatives are illegal. 
A list of 34 ‘fence-breaking’ provinces and responsible officials were named in the Decision No. 1387 
on 29 December, 2005 by the Prime Minister and then punished despite the fact that many policy 
experimentation and innovations at the provincial level have been legalized later on and become very 
successful.  The  real  number  of  fence-breakers  may  be  higher  due  to  informational  constraints. 
Obviously, along with formal decentralization, fence-breaking is critical to the change in government 
performance. The high degree of actual autonomy at the sub-central levels has intensified the conflicts 
between  the  central  government  and  sub-central  governments  and  also  created  intergovernmental 
competition for resources, especially private and foreign invested capital, a means to build greater 
autonomy for the later. On the positive side, both formal decentralization and informal decentralization 
contribute to policy innovation and subsequently to enhancing the quality of governance in many 
aspects. However, at the beginning stage of decentralization, some formal procedures are not effective 
and strong enough and need relying on a certain private order to maintain the public order. 
Since 2005, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the Vietnam Competitiveness 
Initiative  (VNCI)  project  sponsored  by  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development 
(USAID)  conducted  a  survey  of  businesses  regarding  their  perceptions  of  the  quality  of  local 
governments and business environment. In 2005, 2,020 firms in 42 provinces responded to the survey. 
Based  on  the  survey  results  and  actual  economic  performance  of  each  province,  the  Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI)
**** was built. Initially, PCI2005 had nine sub-indices. Since 2006, PCI 
surveys have attracted about 7,000 firms’ responses and the PCI index is comprised of 11 sub-indices, 
measuring  entry  costs,  time  costs  of  regulatory  compliance,  land  access  and  tenure  security, 
transparency,  corruption,  institutional  quality,  competition  environment,  proactivity  of  provincial 
leadership, labor policy, quality of public services to the private sector, and infrastructure. The PCI 
also shows firms’ perception of the degree of decentralization in Vietnam. Particularly, the PCI2007 
shows an average of only 8.4% of surveyed firms predicts that central laws are consistently enforced at 
                                                           
‡‡‡ Authors’ calculation is based on the Balance Sheet of State Budget and Provincial Budget from 2000-2008 
issued by the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam. 
§§§  The term ‘fence-breaking’ has been used to describe the violation of central government regulations by state-
owned enterprises before decentralization.  
****  The full survey is available on the website www.pcivietnam.org. 9 | P a g e  
 
the  sub-central  levels.  Approximately  39%  of  private  firms  agree  or  strongly  agree  that  local 
governments use their own rules and regulations to extract rents.  
The wide discretion of local officials is confirmed in many empirical studies (Litvack and Rondinelli 
1999, Tenev 2003). Tenev et al. asked CEOs of a sample of SOEs and private firms how they reacted 
with ambiguous regulations and realized that local officials have various ways to interpret them at 
their discretions. Litvack and Rondinelli found local governments have different views of enforcing 
central laws and regulations: some provinces are more flexible than others in implementing central 
regulatory policies and experimenting with their provincial strategies. 
There  are  attempts  to  explain  why  local  leaders  have  superior  influence  over  central  laws  and 
regulations and how they build their local autonomy. The most popular reason that still prevails today 
is historical and cultural relics. Local governments in Vietnam evolve from traditions of community or 
village  self-governance.  ‘Village  culture’  which  prioritizes  local  rules  over  national  laws  and 
regulations has a great influence on economic activity and make the conflict between the central – 
local  relationship  intense.  Although  villages  are  not  administrative  units  of  central  and  local 
governments, rules set by the head of each village has strong power in effect and those national laws 
and regulations conflicting with village rules are suppressed. This is illustrated in the well-known 
sayings ‘Phep vua thua le lang’ (translated as ‘The King’s laws are held back by village rules’).  
In addition to historical and cultural determinants, government organizational structure is also a part of 
the issue. The highly hierarchical structure of the government also creates opportunities for sub-central 
leaders  to  exercise  their  de  facto  autonomy.  First,  the  four-level  vertical  organization  of  the 
government  from  the  central  to  three  sub-central  layers  (including  the  provincial,  district,  and 
communal) and the fiscal autonomy of provincial governments allow a great extent of flexibility and 
asymmetry in implementing and enforcing central laws and regulations. Due to distance between the 
central  and  local  governments,  there  is  less  likelihood  that  the  central  legal  documents  are 
implemented as directed and the outcomes of central policies are vastly subjected to the discretion of 
sub-central  governments.  Second,  different  from  higher  level  administrative  agencies,  sub-central 
administrative units are organized on the subordination principle. They are governed and supervised 
by an elected body, the People’s Council at each level. The Councils represent state power at each of 
sub-central levels. The People’s Council elects the People’s Committee as an executive organ of the 
Council.  Some  functional  committees  (Special  Economics  Committee,  Finance  Committee,  and 
others)  accountable  to  the  People’s  Committee  are  established  to  deal  with  particular  demand  of 
businesses and citizens. The responsibilities and powers of these organizations are stipulated in the 
national legislature and sub-law documents, but ambiguous enough to give them wide latitude in 
governance, and even freedom in overturning each other’s decisions.  
Another explanation is the inconsistency, complexity and ambiguity of the legal system. Tenev (2003) 
argues that the wide discretion of local officials stem from the inconsistent legislation. When a new 
law is introduced, it just provides a general framework and leaves sub-central officials with a huge 
freedom to work out the details and with difficulties in enforcing a mountain of legal documents 
issued by ministries and upper level agencies. Nguyen (2004) classified the legal system of Vietnam 
into three groups. The first group includes very transparent documents (including laws, sub-laws, and 
regulations). The Enterprise Law of 1999 is in this category. Business registration procedures under 
this law are not significantly different across provinces. However, the number of legal documents in 
this group is inconsiderable. The second group is a set of outdated documents that fail to govern new 10 | P a g e  
 
economic activities. For example, there are no official central government regulations governing the 
private sector involvement in infrastructure. This creates room for local governments to use their 
discretion to  make  their  own  laws  in  this  domain.  The third  group covers an  extensive  range  of 
ambiguous and complex documents that are difficult to implement or highly costly if implemented 
properly. The majority of legal documents in Vietnam belong to this category. Land regulations are an 
example. Businesses that face laws and regulations in the last two categories tend to rely on local 
officials’ interpretation, which incidentally increase the power of local governments.  
A recent study on informal decentralization in Vietnam by Malesky (2008) uses the content analysis 
approach  to  identify  what  factors  among  geographical  locations,  political  connection,  natural 
endowments,  and  the  dominant  source  of  economic  activity  in  terms  of  ownership  are  main 
contributors to policy autonomy of local leaders. They find that no listed factors have a significant 
impact on the actual level of local autonomy on their own accounts, but FDI inflows into provinces do. 
His findings may spur suspects of the newspapers content analysis method failing to collect reliable 
data,  for  example,  for  those  provinces  being  embedded  in  close  relationships  with  the  central 
government.  Political  sensitivity  and  media  bias  may  lead  to  missing  data
††††.    Furthermore, 
endogeneity can add up to the matter.  
2.3. Interrelationship between formal and informal decentralization 
Is  formal  decentralized  system  of  public  goods  and  order  provision  complementary,  substitute, 
accommodating, or competing with the informal system? Vu (2007) showed that the principle of ‘top-
down’  decentralization  is  employed  in  Vietnam  in  the  manner  in  which  those  functions  and 
responsibilities  the  higher-level  government  should  not  do  will  be  assigned  to  lower-level 
governments.  This  principle  is  contrary  to  the  bottom-up  decentralization  which  the  higher-level 
government  will  be  responsible  for  those  tasks  or  functions  the  lower  layers  are  unable  to  do. 
Decentralization from the top aims to constrain local autonomy by increasing their accountability, yet 
it also makes local officials feel unnecessarily constrained in some instances. The top-down principle 
also  places  the  upper  governments  in  the  position  of  the  main  accountable  persons  and  creates 
opportunities for their lower partners – who implement assigned responsibilities – to throw the ball of 
accountability  to  the  upper  layers.  Ultimately,  the  upper  governments  feel  a  lot  of  pressures  of 
workload while facilitating the lower dependence on them. This moral hazard problem shields a mask 
to uncontrollable local autonomy.  
Culture also explains how formal and informal decentralization differs across regions. The difference 
in culture between the North and the South has been discussed by Rambo (1973), Taylor (1983), and 
Jamieson (1993) who identify the North as being more dependent on central government and more 
closed than the open and relatively autonomous South. This distinction is sourced from the less rigid 
pattern of village organization, more market-friendly mindset and the longer Western dominance in 
the South than in the North.  
All above arguments lead to our prediction that formal decentralized system of public order and goods 
provision  is  introduced  to  control  the  well-established  informal  one.  By  defining  the  specific 
responsibilities  of  local  governments  in  law,  the  central  government’s  goal  is  to  encourage  the 
complementarity between the formal and informal systems and the accountability of the latter for 
                                                           
†††† This measure can be criticized because press is not highly free in Vietnam and information is not always 
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designed  tasks  of  the  former  in  the  beginning  period  of  the  reform.  However,  the  top-down 
decentralization system shows a lot of shortcomings. The immature and ineffective process fails to 
hold lower-level governments accountable to central objectives, and even creates a lot of gaps for 
them to exercise their autonomy. Therefore, the increase of the formal degree of decentralization may 
be not decreasing with the level of local autonomy. In other words, the formal system cannot substitute 
its informal counterpart, but tends to accommodate it, at least in the time being. This process may be 
extremely long-lasting as the informal system is backed by the culture that respects ‘village’ rules and 
the presence of cultural difference between the North and the South. However, the increase in the local 
autonomy definitely undermines the formal system in any stages of the reform as long as a competing 
private order is still strong. So, the central government designs the formal system in the way that 
provides less decision rights to those sub-central governments that have more (or very large) actual 
autonomy. 
This  section  shows  the  semi-uniform  decentralization  policy  across  provinces  may  explain  the 
variation in the quality of sub-central governments within homogenous legal institutional settings. The 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of this important reform on governance performance of local 
governments is necessary to identify what dimensions of the quality of governments need further 
attention of decentralization reform and how decentralization is designed in the next stage to improve 
government quality. In other words, it is essential to know whether current decentralization design is 
creating motivations for local officials to be accountable and effective. The above analysis also pushes 
forward the need to take historical and cultural matters into the designing process of decentralization. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Data and Measurement 
The definitions and sources for all variables used in this paper are summarized in Table 1. Below is 
the description of how measures of decentralization, sub-central governance performance and other 
control variables are formulated in our paper. 
3.1.1. Measuring formal and informal decentralization 
When measuring the degree of formal decentralization, most works employ the number of tiers or a 
federal dummy as proxies for formal decentralization (Huther and Shah 1998, Fisman and Gatti 2002, 
Alexeev and Habodaszova 2007). However, they are not good variables in within-country analysis, 
especially in an authoritarian state. We use the data of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam to 
calculate the logarithmized proportion of total government employment under the management of 
provincial  governments  as  the  proxy  for  our  formal  decentralization  variable  (FD-EMPLOY).  It 
measures the extent of provincial autonomy in recruiting, using, training, promoting, and firing their 
officials and has been utilized by Hughes (1991), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Treisman (2002a), and Jin, 
Qian, and Weingast (2005). Although these works treat state employment decentralization as a de 
factor measure, the quota imposed by the central government in our case make FD-EMPLOY  similar 
to a de jure decentralization policy and fit well our concept of formal decentralization in terms of its 
legitimacy.  
The measure of human resource decentralization faces several critics. Oates (1972) argues that it does 
not always reflect the actual policy autonomy of SNGs as the later also depends on the behavior and 
actions of local officials in practice. Malesky (2004 and 2008) emphasizes the importance of actual 12 | P a g e  
 
autonomy as a main source of incentives for sub-central government officials in their governance. In 
this paper, we do not follow the newspaper-content analysis approach proposed by Malesky (2004, 
2008), but use a different measure of informal decentralization, the so-called ID, constructed on the 
results of the Provincial Competitiveness Index 2006-2008 questionnaire survey with the participation 
of  over  7000  firms  across  64  provinces.  It  should  be  noted  that  our  model  is  tested,  using  the 
provincial  level  data.  ID  is  built  on  three  PCI  questions  surveying  firms’  perception  of  how 
autonomous their provinces are in the making and implementation of public policies. Private firms 
(accounting  for  95.66%  of  total  active  firms,  excluding  foreign  invested  firms,  as  of  December 
2008
‡‡‡‡) generally have low political connection compared with state-owned enterprises, and hence 
are expected to  give  less biased  evaluation  of  government  quality. The question  H7.3  asks firms 
whether the local government where they are domiciled is flexible and innovative in implementing 
central policies to solve local firm-related problems. Question H7.8 asks firms whether no policy 
initiatives are taken at the sub-central level. Question H7.5 takes the opinion of firms about whether 
good policies initiated by subnational governments are overridden by the central government. ID is 
calculated, aggregating three indicators above based on the methodology suggested by PCI 2006
§§§§. 
Each indicator is standardized on a ten-point scale and the final index is the average value of equal 
weight indicators. Cronbach alpha is 0.71. Table 2 presents summary statistics for all variables, and 
table 3 presents the matrix of correlations. Table 3 shows human resource decentralization has a 
positive correlation with informal decentralization measure, but the level of significance is not very 
high (0.22). 
3.1.2. Measuring sub-central governance performance 
Provincial governance performance is evaluated on the basis of the PCI Vietnam surveys from 2006 to 
2008. There are six indicators classified into two categories, measuring the quality of public goods and 
service provision and public order provision. As PCI indices reflect perception of private enterprises 
(the  mass),  excluding  state-owned  enterprises  (the  elite)  and  household  businesses,  about  local 
governance performance, our findings may be biased. However, the elite only accounts for 1.6% of the 
total number of enterprises in 2008
*****, so the PCI index represents the voice of the mass and becomes 
the relatively impartial measure of the government quality. Following is the detailed description of 
how our governance performance variables are built. 
To evaluate the quality of public goods and service delivery, we use three indices, including ‘Private 
Sector Development Policy’ index and ‘Infrastructure’ index of the PCI as proxies for our PS and 
INFRA variables, respectively. PS aggregates evaluation of firms about different services provided by 
provincial government agencies, including the supply of market information, export promotion and 
trade  fairs,  industrial  zones,  and  technology-related  services.  INFRA  is  a  sub-index  of  the 
Infrastructure index, built on both hard data of the number of industrial zones, their coverage, and the 
soft data about firms’ perception of the quality of industrial zones. Similar to our ID variable, the 
                                                           
‡‡‡‡ GSO (2009), Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2009,  Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi. 

















for those  indicators that  have 
positive interpretation and subtracting the above formula from 11 for those negative, where Provincei is the 
indicator value of each province, Minimum is the smallest value of all provinces, and Maximum is the largest 
value of all provinces. Source: PCI Vietnam Report 2006, available at www.pcivietnam.org. 
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public goods and service supply variables are ten-point scale indices, with the higher value of them 
representing the better quality. 
Table 1: Description of the Variables 
Variable Name  Description  Source 
FD_EMPLOY  The logarithm of the proportion of government employment 
under provincial management in the total government 
employment, averaging the 2006-2008 periods. 
MOF
i 
ID  A measure of flexibility and innovation in making and 
implementing policies of SNGs (scaled from 1 to 10), using some 
questions in the PCI Vietnam 2006-2008.  
Author’s 
calculation 
PS  A measure of the quality of public services regarding the 
provision of information about market, technology, export 
promotion and trade fairs, and industrial zones by local 
governments, using the Private Sector Development Policies 
index of the PCI 2006-2008. 
PCI
iii 
IZ  A measure of the quality and coverage of industrial zones in the 
province, using the Industrial Zone Quality and Coverage sub-
index of the Infrastructure index of the PCI Vietnam survey 2008 
(scaled from 1 to 10). 
PCI
iii 
LEGAL1  A measure of trust in provincial legal institutions, using the Legal 




LEGAL2  A measure of the predictability of implementing central laws by 
provincial governments, using the average of two sub-indices 
(‘Predictability’ and ‘Accessibility’) of the Transparency index of 
the PCI Vietnam survey 2006-2008 (scaled from 1 to 10). 
PCI
iii 
PRO_RIGHTS  We use the Land Access and Tenure index of the PCI Vietnam 
2006-2008 to measure the tenure security across provinces of 
Vietnam (scaled from 1 to 10). 
PCI
iii 
CORRUPTION  We use the Informal Charges index in the PCI Vietnam 2006-
2008 survey as the proxy for corruption.  It is scaled from 1 to 10. 
PCI
iii 
NORTH  The dummies with 1 = North and 0 = South.  GSO
ii 
FENCE_BREAK  The dummies with 1 representing those provinces reported in the 
Decision No. 1387 on 29th December 2005 by the Prime Minister 
to have issued local regulations regarding out-of-law investment 
incentive policies. 
 
LREV_GDP  The logarithm of the share of provincial tax revenue in the total 
provincial GDP in real terms in 2005. 
MOF
i 
LPOP  The logarithm of the proportion of provincial population in the 
total national population in 2005 
GSO
ii 




TIERS  The number of tiers under provincial governments.  GSO
ii 
LHOSPITAL  The logarithm of the number of state hospitals in the province in 
the total number of hospitals in 2005.  
GSO
ii 
CAPABILITY  The percentage of firms in PCI Vietnam surveys that agree and 
strongly agree that provincial officials are knowledgeable enough 




i) MOF: Ministry of Finance of Vietnam; ii) GSO: General Statistics Office of Vietnam; iii) PCI: www.pcivietnam.org 14 | P a g e  
 
To assess the quality of public order provision, we follow Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Huther and 
Shah (1998), McMillan and Woodruff (2000), and Dixit (2004) and employ three indicators of trust in 
provincial legal institutions, property right security, and corruption. The first one (LEGAL1 variable) 
is the ‘Legal Institutions’sub-index of the PCI Vietnam 2006-2008, capturing firms’ perception of 
legal enforceability and hard data of the number of non-state sector filings to provincial economic 
courts over 100 firms. Our second variable LEGAL2 variable also measures the strength of legal 
institutions from their aspects of predictability. It is the average of two sub-indices (‘Predictability’ 
and  ‘Accessibility’)  of  the  Transparency index  of  the  PCI  Vietnam  survey  2006-2008.  Our  third 
variable  in  this  category,  PRO_RIGHTS,  is  the  ‘Land  Access  and  Tenure’  sub-index  in  the  PCI 
Vietnam 2006-2008, which measures the extent of securing a land title. LEGAL1, LEGAL2, and 
PRO_RIGHTS  variables  are  ten-point  scale  indices  with  their  higher  values  representing  better 
governance performance.  The final one (CORRUPTION variable) is the results of Question G9.2 of 
the PCI Vietnam 2006-2008 surveys, measuring the percentage of firms that strongly agree and agree 
that provincial government officials use local regulations to extract rents. Different from the first three 
variables,  CORRUPTION  has the opposite interpretation  of  its coefficients in terms  of  sign. The 
higher value of CORRUPTION represents the more seriousness of the crime, and accordingly the 
worse governance performance of provincial governments. In other words, we expect the signs of the 
coefficients of (in)formal decentralization variables in governance equations for three first variables 
(LEGAL1,  LEGAL2,  and  PRO_RIGHTS)  to  be  in  contrast  with  those  for  the  CORRUPTION 
equation,  although  this  contradiction  still  imply  the  similar  direction  (good/bad)  of  influence  of 
decentralization on government quality. 
3.1.3. Control variables 
We also control for other province-specific factors that may impact decentralization variables and 
provincial governance performance. Analysis in section 2 shows cultural difference between the North 
and the South really matters, so we use NORTH dummy to control for the impact of culture on our 
main  variables.  Another  cultural  consideration  is  the  policy-making  culture  in  Viet  Nam,  fence-
breaking. However, not all provinces adopt it. This feature of de facto local autonomy may affect the 
incentives  of  local  government  officials  to  be  autonomous  and  subsequently  their  governance 
performance.  Therefore,  we  also  include  the  dummy  FENCE_BREAK  with  1  representing  those 
provinces reported in the Decision No. 1387 on 29th December 2005 by the Prime Minister to have 
issued local regulations regarding out-of-law investment incentive policies to diagnose the sign and 
significance of both formal and informal decentralization in relation to the quality of sub-national 
governments. Table 3 shows FENCE_BREAK has very low correlation with AUTONOMY and with 
other variables. It is possible that not all fence-breakers are identified and punished by the central 
government, especially in the setting of limited media freedom before 2005.  
Market size and economic condition of each province are also controlled for. The LPOP variable (the 
logarithm of the proportion of provincial population in the total national population in 2005) and 
LAREA variable (the log of the share of provincial area out of the total national area in 2005) are 
included  in  our  models  to  control  for  the  market  size  of  each  province.  In  order  to  control  for 
economic conditions of each province, we use the logarithm of the share of provincial tax revenue in 
the provincial real GDP in 2005 (or LREV_GDP variable). The main argument is that government 
officials  are  motivated  by  extrinsic  incentives, not excluding  their  provincial  revenue from  taxes. 
Taxes  will  be  the  channel  to  sponsor  their  autonomous  activities  and  help  them  depend  less  on 
transfers (Qian and Roland 1998, La Porta et al. 1999, Fisman and Gatti 2002). Another indicator that 15 | P a g e  
 
determines the difference in decentralization and governance performance is the number of tiers of 
governments  (TIERS  variable).  In  most  empirical  studies  on  decentralization  and  governance 
performance, TIERS  is  treated  as  a formal  measure  of  de jure decentralization  (Treisman  2002a, 
2002b; Lessmann and Markwardt 2010). We include TIERS variable to test their potential influence 
on our explained and explanatory variables. 
We follow the current literature of political agency theory and agree that politicians and bureaucrats 
pursue  different  goals.  In  addition  to  intrinsic  incentives  of  a  ‘provincial  president’  identity  as 
discussed above, they are also motivated by the probability of being appointed to be the members of 
the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, where the most important national laws 
and policies are determined. The number and structure of the Central Committee varies over a 5-year 
term  and  depends  on  the  bargaining  power  of  each  provincial  government,  probably  through 
connections with existing members of the government and the politburo. Therefore, to control for the 
probability that the Central Committee’s membership is an important determinants of both formal and 
informal autonomy and an incentive for the performance of provincial government officials, we use 
the percentage of provincial representatives in the tenth Central Committee established in 2006 as the 
proxy, or POLI_CONNECT variable. The tenth Central Committee elected in 2006 had 161 official 
members with 64 seats being the presidents of People’s Councils or the General Secretary of 63 
provinces (excluding Dak Nong), and the rest being top members of the Government, the politburo, 
military, ministries, and other government agencies. In order to identify which provinces have stronger 
connection  with  the  Central  Committee,  we  base  on  information  about  their  (most  longstanding) 
position in a certain provincial people’s council or secretariat; otherwise, we rely on their place of 
birth.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
FD_EMPLOY   64  -5.02  0.49  -5.91  -3.25 
ID  64  5.15  1.42  2.51  9.39 
NORTH  64  0.45  0.50  0  1 
FENCE_BREAK  64  0.53  0.50  0  1 
LREV_GDP  64  -1.81  0.46  -2.67  -0.78 
LPOP  64  7.00  0.56  5.70  8.68 
LAREA  64  6.00  0.78  4.41  7.41 
TIERS  64  5.25  0.47  4  6 
POLI_CONNECT  64  -4.40  0.70  -5.20  -2.90 
LHOSPITAL  64   5.99  0.78  4.41  7.41 
CAPABILIY  64  -4.24  0.39  -5.32  -3.13 
PS  64  4.54  1.32  2.3  8.1 
INFRA  64  3.44  1.69  1.00  8.07 
LEGAL1  64  4.23  0.74  2.52  6.14 
LEGAL2  64  4.19  0.79  2.36  6.22 
PRO_RIGHTS   64  6.31  0.68  4.61  7.68 
CORRUPTION  64  0.39  0.09  0.23  0.73 16 | P a g e  
 
3.2. Methodology 
As our case study in section 2 implies our prediction of an absence of complementary and substitutive 
relationships  between  formal  and  informal  decentralization  dimensions  and  the  existence  of 
accommodation  and  competition  between  them,  the  proof  should  be  based  on  the  simultaneous 
interaction  between  two  dimensions  of  decentralization  and  their  resulting  impact  on  governance 
performance.  A  common  testing  method is to  include  an  interaction term  of  two  decentralization 
variables in an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model of governance performance being the dependent 
variable. However, our decentralization variables are continuous and endogenously determined. The 
inclusion  of  the  interaction  term  in  the  OLS  model  will  produce  biased  estimations  due  to  its 
significant correlation with the individual terms and its failure to account for endogeneity. 
In order to prove our hypothesis, we have to test a system of equations when both formal and informal 
decentralization  is  simultaneously  determined.  First,  we  test  whether  the  degree  of  formal 
decentralization  is  determined  by  the  extent  of  informal  decentralization.  Second,  we  must  test 
whether the degree of informal decentralization is determined by the extent of formal decentralization. 
Finally, we test the influence of both formal and informal decentralization variables on indicators of 
government quality. We follow the approach of Zellner and Theil (1962), Greene (2002) and Poppo 
and Zenger (2004), using the 3SLS model. "It can be shown that among all instrumental variable (IV) 
estimators  that  use  only  the  sample  information embodied in  the  system,  3SLS  is  asymptotically 
efficient" (Green 2002, p407).The use of the 3SLS model allows us to produce consistent estimates 
while taking correlation in the disturbance across equations into account (Stata 1999). The empirical 
model testing three above simultaneous equations is given by: 
FD_EMPLOYi = αF0 + αF1IDi 
            + αF2NORTHi + αF3FENCE_BREAKi + αF4TIERSi + αF5LREV_GDPi + αF6LPOPi  
            + αF7LAREAi + αF8POLI_CONNECTi +  αF9LHOSPITALi +uFi                                                     (1)                                                                              
IDi = αI0 + αI1 FD_EMPLOYi  
      + αI2NORTHi + αI3FENCE_BREAKi + αI4TIERSi + αI5LREV_GDPi + αI6LPOPi  
      + αI7LAREAi + αI8POLI_CONNECTi +  αI9CAPABILITYi +uIi                                                                           (2)                                                                                                                             
GOV_PERFORMANCEij = δ0j + δ1j FD_EMPLOYi + δ2jIDi  
     + δ3jNORTHi + δ4jFENCE_BREAKi + δ5jTIERSi + δ6jLREV_GDPi  
     + δ7jLPOPi + δ8jLAREAi + δ9jPOLI_CONNECTi + ζij                                            (3)                                                                                                                             
where FD_EMPLOYi and IDi, are the degrees of formal and informal decentralization in province i, 
and GOV_PERFORMANCEij represents the indicator j of the provincial government performance in 
province i, with j = {public service delivery quality; infrastructure quality; legal enforcement; property 
right protection; corruption} = {PS; INFRA; LEGAL1; LEGAL2; PRO_RIGHTS; CORRUPTION}. 
NORTHi,  FENCE_BREAKi,  TIERSi,  LREV_GDPi,  LPOPi,  LAREAi,  and  POLI_CONNECTi  are 
control variables in province i. uDi, uIi, and ζij are error terms in respective equations. The interaction 
term between FENCE_BREAK and TIERS variables (proxies for informal and formal dimensions of 
decentralization) will be added later on to partially check the robustness of the baseline models.   17 | P a g e  
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
ID 
FD_ 




_GDP  LPOP 
LAREA  TIERS  POLI_ 
CONNECT  LHOSPITAL 
FD_EMPLOY  0.2249       
NORTH   -0.3360*  0.0756       
FENCE_BREAK  0.0676  -0.0043  -0.1514       
LREV_GDP  0.2240  0.1920  -0.0683  -0.1097       
LPOP  0.1826  0.3118*  -0.0077  -0.0757  -0.0457       
LAREA  -0.3308*  -0.0155  -0.0810  0.0340  -0.1294  -0.2303       
TIERS  -0.0537  0.2360  0.0503  -0.1674  -0.0420  0.0140  0.3058*     
POLI_CONNECT  0.1366  0.4611*  0.2558*  0.0859  -0.1015  0.1577  -0.2801*  -0.1793   
LHOSPITAL  0.1578  0.7761*  0.2545*  0.0755  0.0237  0.2049  0.1001  0.2571*  0.4512* 
CAPABILITY  0.7095*  -0.2264  -0.1858  0.1496  -0.1061  0.0552  -0.1238  -0.0556  -0.0976  -0.1017 
* Indicates 95% confidence interval, N=64 
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The  3SLS  model  estimates  three  above  equations  simultaneously  in  three  stages  following  the 
procedure of STATA (1999). The first stage is to produce the instrumented values of all endogenous 
variables  (formal  and  informal  decentralization)  which  are  their  predicted  values  generated  from 
ordinary  least  squared  (OLS)  regressions  of  each  endogenous  variable  on  all  other  exogenous 
variables. In order to minimize causality problems, the timing of exogenous variables are chosen at 
least one year before the 2006-2008 period of endogenous variables. The second stage produces a 
consistent  estimate  of  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  equation  disturbances.  They  are  the  residuals 
produced from the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation of each structural equation. In this stage, 
the  choice  of  instrument  variables  for  each  equation  is  critical.  First,  we  use  the  logarithmized 
percentage  of  state  hospitals  in  the  province  in  the  total  national  number  of  state  hospitals 
(LHOSPITAL variable) as an identifying instrument in the equation predicting the degree of state 
employment decentralization (or formal decentralization). The distribution of public hospitals in each 
province is one of the determinants of the quota for state officials working in these facilities, and 
hence of the degree of decentralization in state employment management. Table 3 shows the high 
correlation between state employment decentralization with its identifying instrument (0.78) while it is 
insignificantly  correlated  with  informal  decentralization  and  other  controls.  For  informal 
decentralization equations, we use the result of the PCI question H7.2 in 2006, which is the percentage 
of  firms  in  PCI  Vietnam  surveys  that  agree  and  strongly  agree  that  provincial  officials  are 
knowledgeable enough about central laws to solve upcoming problems for firms (our CAPABILITY 
variable). The link between capability of government officials and their autonomous behavior has also 
been proved in the studies of Malesky (2008). Table 4 shows CAPABILITY is highly correlated with 
informal decentralization (0.74) while having low correlations with all other variables. The validity of 
instruments is also carefully checked in the first stage of the regressions. The final stage runs the GLS-
type estimation, including all instrumented values of endogenous variables and the covariance matrix 
of  equation  disturbance  in  the  third  equation  regressing  on  the  government  performance.  This 
regression allows obtaining the coefficients of both formal and informal decentralization variables 
with performance simultaneously in the same regression.  
The simultaneous equation model enables to test the pattern of interaction between two endogenous 
variables and their impact on the third variable consistently. Based on the signs and significance of the 
coefficients of endogenous variables in the three equations and the typology of informal institutions 
mapped out by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), we can find out whether formal decentralization and 
informal  decentralization  are  complementary,  substitute,  accommodating,  or  competing.  Although 
Helmke and Levitsky’s typology has also been reviewed in the introduction, we want to make it 
clearer about the meaning of the coefficient’s signs. The tests support complementary (or substitute) 
relationship if both formal decentralization and informal decentralization have similar positive (or 
negative) impact on each other (Equation 1 and 2). The tests support accommodating (or competing) 
relationship if the outcomes are dissimilar. However, in order to isolate their actual relation, we need 
to interpret the signs and significance of the coefficients of formal and informal decentralization in 
equation  3.  The  estimation  supports  accommodating  relationship  if  the  coefficient  of  formal 
decentralization  is  positive,  which  suggests  the  effectiveness  of  this  institution  in  reality.  The 
estimation supports competing relationship if the coefficient of formal decentralization is negative, 
which  implies  the  existence  of  the  ineffective  formal  institution.  We  can  test  whether  the 
accommodating (or competing) effect of formal and informal decentralization is efficiency-enhancing. 
If  both  coefficients  in  equation  3  are  positive,  we  can  conclude  there  exists  the  accommodating 19 | P a g e  
 
relationship and its effect on governance performance is efficiency-enhancing. If the coefficients are 
different, we can conclude the direction of effect of each decentralization measure on governance 
performance, based on their negative or positive signs.  
3.3 Results 
Table 4 presents the results of our 3SLS estimation. Each equation is estimated with/without the 
interaction  term  between  the  dummy  FENCE_BREAK  (a  supplementary  proxy  for  informal 
decentralization)  and  the  number  of  sub-central  tiers  of  government  –  TIERS  variable  (a 
supplementary  proxy  for  formal  decentralization),  and  the  results  are  presented  in  the  respective 
columns A/B for each equation
18.  
Equation 1 tests whether the increase in the level of informal decentralization is associated with the 
higher or lower degree of state human resource decentralization. The main coefficients of equation 1 
support  the  substitute  effect  of  informal  dimension  on  its  formal  counterpart.  Those  provinces 
identified  with  the  higher  level  of  policy  autonomy  are  the  ones  with  lower  empowerment  in 
management of state human resources.  This implies the role of formal decentralization serving as an 
instrument of the central government in restraining the undesirable autonomy or encouraging sub-
central proactivity in the desired areas. The coefficients of control variables are also consistent with 
our hypothesis of the impact of cultural, political, demographic, and economic factors specific to each 
province on the degree of formal decentralization. The Southern provinces have significantly higher 
levels of formal decentralization than those in the North. Those provinces that have bigger shares of 
tax  revenue  contribution  to  the  provincial  GDP  are  also  assigned  with  more  power  in  their 
employment  management.  This  is  also  true  for  more  populous  provinces  and  those  with  more 
representatives in the central committee of the Communist Party. The market size in terms of area and 
the number of sub-central tiers of government have insignificant influence on formal decentralization. 
Those provinces recorded to have broken the central fence show no relation to the formal degree of 
employment decentralization. As noted above, political collusion or the lack of press freedom may 
leave some fence-breaker out of this list. The measure of policy autonomy in our model reflects more 
accurately  the informality  of  decentralization in  reality  than  FENCE-BREAK  dummy.  Column  B 
shows  no  significant  change  to  the  coefficients  even  after  the  interaction  term  between 
FENCE_BREAK  and  TIERS  are  controlled  for,  and  their  interaction  does  not  affect  formal 
decentralization. Consistent with the validity check for the instrument based on the correlation matrix 
and  the  first-stage  regressions,  the  significance  of  the  instrument  coefficient  with  formal 
decentralization measure in equation 1 further supports that. 
 Equation 2 tests whether informal decentralization depends on the formal assignment of autonomy in 
human resource management at the provincial level. The results show those provinces assigned with 
the higher degree of formal decentralization have higher level of actual autonomy. This implies formal 
decentralization  is  really  a  determinant  of  the  inflation  of  informal  behavior  at  the  sub-national 
government level. Similar to formal decentralization, tax revenue is a significant incentive to local 
autonomy, and Southern provinces do have higher level of informal decentralization than Northern 
ones. The degree of informality is also significantly higher in smaller provinces, which support earlier 
studies.  However,  the  market  size  in  terms  of  population  and  political  connection  influence 
                                                           
18 As we have explained in the introduction, the reason we do not include the interaction term between our two 
main  measures  of  decentralization  is  that  the  interaction  term  between  two  continuous  variables  are  highly 
correlated with its single terms and lead to endogeneity bias.  20 | P a g e  
 
insignificantly  the  extent  of  informal  decentralization  in  our  case.  Those  provinces  listed  in  the 
Decision No. 1387 of the Prime Minister are not those with higher level of local autonomy. This may 
be explained by the fact that low press freedom and poor information access in the country hindered 
the  central  government  from  identifying  many  other  fence-breaking  cases  and  this  distorts  the 
estimation results. This fact is also observed for the effect of the number of sub-central tiers. Column 
B of equation 2 show the coefficients do not change significantly after we control for the interaction 
term between the fence-breaking dummy and tiers of sub-central governments. The results are further 
supported by the significance and validity check of the instrument. 
The first two equations show the mutual impact of formal and informal decentralization on the other is 
significant, but divergent. The increase in the level of formal decentralization is associated with the 
higher actual degree of local autonomy. However, more autonomous provinces are assigned with less 
formal empowerment in provincial human resource management. They, therefore, do not support the 
complementary or substitute relationships. The typology of Helmke and Levitsky suggests that they 
are  likely  to  be  accommodating  or  competing,  dependent  on  whether  formal  decentralization  is 
effective or not. We argue that the quality of the formal procedures is not similar for all functions and 
tasks of local governments. We attempt to test the effect of formal and informal systems in two areas: 
public goods and service supply and public order provision. The estimation results are presented in 
equation 3 for two indicators of public goods and service quality (business promotion and technology 
information supply services and infrastructure) and four other indicators of public order provision 
(trust  in  legal  institutions,  law  predictability,  property  right  protection,  and  corruption).  For  each 
governance indicator of equation 3, we present the specifications in two cases – without and with the 
interaction term between the fence-breaking dummy and the number of sub-central tiers – in the 
respective column A and B.  
Equations  3  show  a  common  trend  of  impact  within  each  group  of  indicators,  but  difference  is 
observed between the two groups. Both formal and informal systems have significant and positive 
impact on the quality of public goods and service supply (public service quality – PS variable, and 
infrastructure quality – INFRA variable). This implies that the formally decentralized system has been 
designed in the way that gives priority to the effective provision of public goods and services. The 
policy autonomy of provincial governments also contributes to the betterment of public role in this 
area. The effectiveness of formal decentralization in the provision of public goods and services and the 
simultaneous existence of the divergence between formal and informal decentralization suggest their 
accommodating relationship in this public sector following Helmke and Levitsky’s classifications of 
institutions. However, in case of public order provision, the positive and significant impact is only 
observed  for  informal  decentralization.  The  group  of  equations,  including  legal  enforceability 
(LEGAL1), law predictability (LEGAL2), property right security (PRO_RIGHTS), and corruption 
level (CORRUPTION), show the negative and significant effect of formal decentralization on the 
quality of providing public order. Its system of providing public order is not effective enough to raise 
public trust in its enforceability, property rights protection and its ability to reduce corruption. The 
ineffectiveness of formal system in public order provision and the simultaneous divergent impact of 
informal decentralization on formal decentralization suggest that there be a competing relationship. In 
other words, in the time being, the informal system functions as a competing institution to the formal 
one. So our 3SLS estimation supports the view that in the first 15 years since decentralization was 
initiated, the formally decentralized system is accommodating the informal one in the supply of public  
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Table 4: Interrelationship between formal and informal decentralization and their impact on local governance performance: the 3SLS model 






Determinants of Governance Performance 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
          PS  INFRA  LEGAL1  LEGAL2  PRO_RIGHTS  CORRUPTION
≠ 
  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B) 















      (0.313)  (0.309)  (0.308)  (0.298)  (0.594)  (0.595)  (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.286)  (0.279)  (0.220)  (0.219)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
                                 
ID  -0.078
**  -0.077













  (0.037)  (0.037)      (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.155)  (0.154)  (0.0613)  (0.061)  (0.075)  (0.072)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
















  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.166)  (0.168)  (0.189)  (0.186)  (0.365)  (0.372)  (0.145)  (0.147)  (0.176)  (0.174)  (0.135)  (0.137)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
                                 
FENCE_BREAK  -0.039  -0.237  -0.192  -2.442  0.093  3.830
**  0.284  0.955  -0.112  0.072  0.226  2.989
*  0.208
*  1.435  -0.017  -0.172 
  (0.073)  (0.840)  (0.163)  (1.862)  (0.165)  (1.856)  (0.318)  (3.706)  (0.126)  (1.469)  (0.153)  (1.737)  (0.118)  (1.364)  (0.011)  (0.130) 
                                 
TIERS  0.128  0.111  -0.060  -0.257  -0.195  0.133  -0.220  -0.161  0.378
**  0.394
*  -0.118  0.125  0.220  0.328
*  -0.016  -0.030 
  (0.085)  (0.112)  (0.204)  (0.259)  (0.209)  (0.257)  (0.402)  (0.513)  (0.159)  (0.203)  (0.194)  (0.241)  (0.149)  (0.189)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
                                 
FENCE_BREAK    0.038    0.427    -0.710
**    -0.128    -0.035    -0.525    -0.233    0.030 
*TIERS    (0.159)    (0.352)    (0.352)    (0.702)    (0.278)    (0.329)    (0.258)    (0.025) 
                                 
LPOP  0.135
**  0.135
**  -0.101  -0.103  0.182  0.185  0.280  0.281  0.006  0.006  0.068  0.070  -0.008  -0.007  -0.006  -0.006 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.162)  (0.160)  (0.165)  (0.159)  (0.318)  (0.318)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.153)  (0.149)  (0.118)  (0.117)  (0.011)  (0.011) 







**  0.387  0.394  0.375
**  0.377





  (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.198)  (0.196)  (0.208)  (0.201)  (0.401)  (0.402)  (0.159)  (0.159)  (0.193)  (0.188)  (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
                                 
LAREA  -0.055  -0.057  -0.386
***  -0.422
***  -0.257






***  -0.061  -0.044  -0.020
**  -0.023
** 
  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.243)  (0.250)  (0.096)  (0.099)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.090)  (0.092)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
                                 
POLI_CONNECT  0.165
***  0.164




***  0.042  0.053  0.017  0.0217  0.002  0.002 
  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.170)  (0.168)  (0.176)  (0.170)  (0.338)  (0.338)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.163)  (0.159)  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
                                 
LHOSPITAL  0.910
***  0.909
***                             
  (0.123)  (0.123)                             
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Table 4: Interrelationship between formal and informal decentralization and their impact on local governance performance: the 3SLS model (Cont.’) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                                       
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 














Determinants of Governance Performance 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
          PS  INFRA  LEGAL1  LEGAL2  PRO_RIGHTS  CORRUPTION
≠ 
  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B) 
                                 
CAPABILITY      0.111
***  0.112
***                         
      (0.009)  (0.009)                         
                                 






**  -2.945  -3.030  -6.430
***  -7.710
***  0.777  0.209  1.565
***  1.636
*** 
  (1.088)  (1.172)  (2.507)  (2.637)  (2.658)  (2.722)  (5.122)  (5.435)  (2.031)  (2.154)  (2.467)  (2.548)  (1.899)  (2.001)  (0.182)  (0.190) 
                                 
N  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64 
χ²  148.58  149.01  269.16  277.21  188.66  204.12  57.81  57.79  86.34  86.58  70.19  74.93  77.51  78.88  199.7  205.5 
R² pseudo  0.69  0.69  0.81  0.82  0.77  0.79  0.48  0.48  0.57  0.60  0.45  0.48  0.56  0.57  0.77  0.77 
P_value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 23 | P a g e  
 
Table 5: Interrelationship between formal and informal decentralization and their impact on local governance performance: the OLS estimations 
  PS  INFRA  LEGAL1  LEGAL2  PRO_RIGHTS  CORRUPTION 














  (0.186)  (0.178)  (0.468)  (0.474)  (0.212)  (0.215)  (0.175)  (0.170)  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.015)  (0.015) 














  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.167)  (0.169)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.0674)  (0.068)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                         
NORTH  -0.477
**  -0.403









  (0.200)  (0.190)  (0.352)  (0.349)  (0.139)  (0.135)  (0.177)  (0.177)  (0.143)  (0.148)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
                         
FENCE_BREAK  0.097  3.871
*  0.301  0.734  -0.116  0.152  0.220  3.149
*  0.207  1.455  -0.018  -0.171 
  (0.166)  (2.017)  (0.332)  (4.049)  (0.128)  (1.952)  (0.171)  (1.597)  (0.143)  (1.537)  (0.012)  (0.136) 
                         
TIERS  -0.217  0.115  -0.032  0.006  0.315
*  0.338
*  -0.243  0.015  0.202  0.312  -0.019  -0.033
** 
  (0.222)  (0.237)  (0.421)  (0.643)  (0.168)  (0.175)  (0.178)  (0.249)  (0.157)  (0.225)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
                         
LPOP  0.167  0.171  0.417  0.417  -0.040  -0.039  -0.0217  -0.019  -0.020  -0.019  -0.009  -0.009 
  (0.153)  (0.142)  (0.356)  (0.358)  (0.141)  (0.142)  (0.141)  (0.142)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
                         
LREV_GDP  0.357  0.394





  (0.226)  (0.215)  (0.392)  (0.393)  (0.210)  (0.216)  (0.163)  (0.157)  (0.135)  (0.140)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
                         
LAREA  -0.310
**  -0.247  -0.688
***  -0.681
***  0.161  0.165  0.491
***  0.540
***  -0.070  -0.050  -0.016
*  -0.019
** 
  (0.146)  (0.153)  (0.224)  (0.238)  (0.096)  (0.103)  (0.108)  (0.116)  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
                         
POLI_CONNECT  -0.265
*  -0.248
*  -0.346  -0.344  0.380
***  0.381
***  -0.111  -0.098  -0.005  0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.132)  (0.135)  (0.354)  (0.358)  (0.126)  (0.129)  (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.107)  (0.110)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
                         
FENCE_BREAK*    -0.717
*    -0.082    -0.051    -0.557
*    -0.237    0.029 
TIERS    (0.379)    (0.780)    (0.368)    (0.295)    (0.285)    (0.025) 




*  7.795  -1.078  -1.219  -2.522  -4.055
*  1.239  0.586  1.519
***  1.599
*** 
  (2.583)  (2.240)  (4.761)  (5.659)  (2.286)  (2.160)  (1.752)  (2.123)  (1.466)  (1.595)  (0.176)  (0.174) 
N  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64  64 
R
2  0.775  0.789  0.500  0.500  0.584  0.584  0.511  0.535  0.563  0.568  0.777  0.782 
P  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses with 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01                               24 | P a g e  
 
services, but the two systems are competing in the provision of public order, as long as the formal 
system does not created more trust in their role of making public order.  
The  signs  and  significance  of  control  coefficients  in  governance  equations  show  some  points  in 
common. The South is significantly better than the North in almost indicators of government quality, 
except law predictability. The variation in the quality of infrastructure is not significant in both parts 
of the country. Those provinces that have more tax contribution to the provincial GDP tend to provide 
better  public  services  and  show  higher  public  trust  in  provincial  legal  institutions  for  enforcing 
contracts.  However, corruption  and  property  right  insecurity  are  higher in  these  provinces. These 
results are generally consistent with the findings in La Porta et al. (1999), except property rights 
protection. Infrastructure and law predictability are not significantly affected by tax revenue. Another 
influential  factor  is  the  size  of  the  province  in  terms  of  area.  Smaller  provinces  have  better 
infrastructure  and  lower  corruption.  Legal  institutions  are,  by  contrast,  more  efficient  in  larger 
provinces.    Political  representation  in  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  impacts 
negatively the quality of infrastructure, but positively the trust in legal institutions. These are the two 
governance indicators that political connection has significant effect. Other controls seem to have 
weak explanation for the difference in governance performance across provinces.  
To check the robustness of the 3SLS model, we run the OLS estimation, including both formal and 
informal decentralization variables into the model. Although interaction terms are often used to test 
the  complementarity  or  substitute  in  the  performance  equation,  the  high  correlation  between  the 
interaction term and its individual variables and our hypothesized endogeneity between them make the 
OLS  results  biased.  Moreover,  the  use  of  the  interaction  terms  does  not  help  us  identify  the 
accommodating  and  competing  relation.  Our  correlation  matrix  in  table  3  show  our  formal 
decentralization and informal decentralization variables have low correlation (0.22), so we present the 
OLS estimation results without the interaction terms with strong belief of their unbiased results. The 
results are presented in odd specifications (1, 3, 5, and 7) of table 5. However, we also run regressions 
with the interaction term between two other weaker proxies for formal and informal decentralization 
(fence-breaking dummy and sub-central tiers) in even specifications of table 5, 4, 6, and 8). Table 5 
shows the signs and significance of coefficients are generally consistent with the findings of the 3SLS. 
We have also checked the multicollinearity problem in all of our regressions. The mean VIFs hover 
around 1.2, which also supports the credibility of our results. In addition to the separation of the 
models  with  and  without  the  interaction  terms,  the  general  low  correlation  between  exogenous 
variables and controls shown in table 3 and the significance of chi-square values (p=0.0000) and R² 
values ranging from 0.45 to 0.82 for all specifications increase the credibility of our estimations.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Most empirical and theoretical work on the interrelationship between formal and informal institutions 
focuses on the complementarity or substitute between them, for example , between the formal contract 
and  other  self-enforcing  mechanisms  such  as  relational  contracts  or  networks.  We  found  that 
accommodating  and  competing  informal  institutions  co-exist  in  the  beginning  period  of 
decentralization rather than complement or substitute, especially in those countries that informally 
decentralized system is rooted in history and culture. There are priorities in the design of formal 
governance system. In the case of Vietnam, the formal decentralization system is effective in dealing 
with those tasks little related to culture such as the provision of public goods and services, but finds 
itself reliant on a well-established informal institutions and private order to maintain the public order. 25 | P a g e  
 
Our findings imply that reforms on improving the effectiveness of the procedure and institutions to 
provide public order are essential to make informal institutions complementary rather than rival or 
free-riding on the weak formal institutions. It should be noted that our findings are based on surveys of 
the perception of private firms about the governance performance and hence the results may be or may 
be not consistent with the perspective of state-owned enterprises or household businesses. We have 
also  considered  the  implication  of  our  hypothesis  of  the  accommodating  and  competing  relation 
between formal and informal system of decentralization for economic growth although the results of 
regressions are not shown in this paper. Applying the same simultaneous equation estimations of the 
3SLS, it turns out that formal decentralization in state human resource management has significant but 
negative  impact  on  the  growth  rate  of  real  provincial  GDP  per  capita  while  provincial  policy 
autonomy  has  positive  but  insignificant  influence  on  growth.  This  result  might  imply  that  the 
accommodation  and  competition  between  the  two  systems  of  decentralization,  especially  the 
ineffectiveness of the formal one in the area of public order provision, are not beneficial to economic 
growth. The findings of this paper generally support the popular view of focusing the reform on 
increasing the strength of the formal system in providing public order and in creating incentives for 
provincial governments to be complementary with the central goals. In other words, the role of central 
government in making the formal system of decentralization more effective and embedded into the 
existing informal system is essential. 
This study has several limitations. First, the findings of accommodating and competing relationships 
between the formal and informal dimensions of decentralization in Vietnam are found in the first two 
decades  of  economic  reform  may  not  fit  the  similar  time  scale  of  reforms  in  other  institutional 
environments (for example, that of developed and developing countries). The generalization of these 
results should consider institutional differences across countries. Second, the study may expand to the 
analysis of other forms and measures of formal and informal decentralized institutions, controlling for 
their endogeneity and using other econometric methods.  
Acknowledgement 
The authors would like to thank Stephen Voigt and other participants at the 10th Journées Louis-
Andre Gerard-Varet Conference in Public Economics in Marseille, the CESifo conference 2011 on 
Law and Economics in Munich, and some other seminars where the paper was presented. 
 
References 
Acemoglu,  D.,  Johnson,  S.,  &  J.  Robinson  (2001)  “The  Colonial  Origins  of  Comparative 
Development: an Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, vol.91(5), 1369–1401. 
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997) “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Universtiy of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29. 
Alexeev M. and L. Habodaszova (2007) “Decentralization, Corruption, and the Unofficial Economy,” 
CAEPR Working Paper. 
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2006) “Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: 
An Overview,’ in Handbook of Economic Corruption, edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Edward 
Elgar. 
Besley, T. and M. Smart (2007) “Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare,” Journal of Public Economics, 
Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4): 755-773. 26 | P a g e  
 
Brennan,  G.  and  J.M.  Buchanan  (1980),  The  Power  to  Tax:  Analytical  Foundations  of  a  Fiscal 
Constitution, Cambridge University Press. 
De  Soto,  H.  (2000),  The  Mystery  of  Capital:  why  Capitalism  Triumphs  in  the  West  and  Fails 
Everywhere Else, New York: Basic Books. 
Dia,  M.  (1996),  Africa’s  Management  in  the  1990s  and  Beyond:  Reconciling  Indigenous  and 
Transplanted Institutions, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Dixit, A. (2003) “On Modes of Economic Governance,” Econometrica, vol. 71(2): 449-481. 
Dixit, A. (2004), Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Mode of Governance, Princeton, NJ and 
Woodstock, UK: Princeton University Press. 
Dixit, A. (2007) “Evaluating Recipes for Development Success,” The World Bank Research Observer, 
vol. 22(2). 
Fisman, R. and R. Gatti (2002) “Decentralization and Corruption - Evidence across Countries,” Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 2290, the World Bank. 
Gambetta,  D.  (1993),  The  Sicilian  Mafia:  the  Business  of  Private  Protection,  Cambridge,  MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Greene, W.H. (2002), Econometric Analysis (5
th Edition),  Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey 07458. 
GSO (General Statistics Office of Vietnam) (2009), Socio-Economic Statistical Data of 63 Provinces 
and Cities, Statistical Publishing House. 
Helmke,  G.  and  S.  Levitsky  (2004)  “Informal  Institutions  and  Comparative  Politics:  A  Research 
Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 2 (4): 725-40. 
Hindriks,  J.  and  B.  Lockwood  (2005)  “Decentralization  and  Electoral  Accountability:  Incentives, 
Separation, and Voter Welfare,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1509. 
Hughes, M.A. (1991) ‘Employment Decentralization and Accessibility: A Strategy for Stimulating 
Regional Mobility’, Journal of the American Planning Association, vol. 57(3): 288-298. 
Huther, J. and A.Shah (1998) “Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on 
Fiscal Decentralisation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1894. 
Jamieson,  N.L.  (1993),  Understanding  Vietnam,  University  of  California  Press:  Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/Oxford. 
Jin,  F.,  Qian  Y.,  and  B.R.  Weingast  (2005)  “Regional  Decentralization  and  Fiscal  Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89 (9-10): 1719-1742. 
Jones-Luong P. (2003) “Economic Decentralization in Kazakhstan: Causes and Consequences,” in 
Pauline Jones-Luong (ed.), The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet 
Rule to Independence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Keefer, P. and M.M. Shirley (2000) “Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development,” 
in  Claude  Ménard  (ed.),  Institutions,  Contracts  and  Organizations:  Perspectives  from  New 
Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA. 
King, E.M. and B. Özler (1998) “What’s Decentralization Got to Do with Learning? The Case of 
Nicaragua’s School Autonomy Reform,” Unpublished paper, The World Bank. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995) “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using 
Alternative Institutional Measures,”  Economics & Politics, vol. 7(3): 207-227.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., and R. Vishny (1999) “The Quality of Government,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 15(1): 222-279.  
Lessmann, C. and G. Markwardt (2010) “One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the 
Monitoring of Bureaucrats,” World Development, vol.38(4): 631-646. 27 | P a g e  
 
Li, J.S. (2003) “The Benefits and Costs of Relation-Based Governance: An Explanation of the East 
Asian Miracle and Crisis,” Review of International Economics, vol. 11(3): 651-673. 
Litvack,  J.  and  D.  Rondinelli  (1999)  “Market  Reform  in  Vietnam:  Building  Institutions  for 
Development,” Westport, Conn.: Quorum, 19. 
Malesky, E.J. (2004) “Leveled Mountains and Broken Fences: Measuring and Analysing de facto 
Decentralization in Vietnam”, European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 3(2): 307-336. 
Malesky, E.J. (2008) “Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational 
Leaders,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 70(1): 97–119. 
Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2005) “Making Fiscal Decentralization Work in Vietnam,” Working Paper No. 
05-13, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. 
McMillan, J. and C. Woodruff (2000) “Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,” Michigan 
Law Review, vol. 98(8): 2421-2458. 
Montinola, G., Quian, Y., and B.R. Weingast (1995) “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis 
for Economic Success in China”, World Politics, vol. 48(1): 50-81. 
Nguyen, D.C, Pham A.T., Bui V., and D. Dapice (2004) “History and Policy: Why Don’t Northern 
Provinces Grow Faster?” CIEM-UNDP Working Paper. 
North,  D.  (1990),  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Oates, W. E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.  
Persson, T.  and G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press.  
Pejovich, S. (1999) “The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on Social 
stability and Economic Development,” Journal of Markets and Morality, vol. 2(2): 164-181. 
Poppo,  L.  and  T.  Zenger  (2002)  “Do  Formal  Contracts  and  Relational  Governance  Function  As 
Substitutes or Complements?” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 23: 707-725. 
Qian, Y. and G. Roland (1998) “Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint,” The American Economic 
Review, vol. 88(5): 1143-1162. 
Rambo, T.A. (1973), A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems of Northern and Southern Vietnam: A 
Study  of  Ecological  Adaptation,  Social  Succession,  and  Cultural  Evolution,  Center  for 
Vietnamese Studies, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 
Ravenel, R.M. (2004) “Community-based Logging and De facto Decentralization: Illegal Logging in 
the Gunung Palung Area of West Kalimantan, Indonesia”, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, vol. 
19(1&3): 213-237. 
Rodden, J. (2004) “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: on Meaning and Measurement,”  
Comparative Politics, vol. 36(4): 481-500. 
Salmon, P. (1987) “Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2): 24-43. 
Seabright,  P.  (1996)  “Accountability  and  Decentralization:  an  Incomplete  Contracts  Model,” 
European Economic Review, vol.40 (1): 61– 90. 
Shah, A. and T. Thompson (2004) “Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous 
Road with Potholes, Detours and Road Closures,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3353. 
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1993) “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.108: 599-
611. 
Stata. (1999) “Reference Manual: Release 6,” Stata: College Station, TX. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2000) “Formal and Informal Institutions,” in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, 
edited by Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 28 | P a g e  
 
Taylor, K.W. (1983), The Birth of Vietnam, University of California Press: Berkeley. 
Taylor, M. (1992) “Formal versus Informal Incentive Structures and Informal Behaviour,” Journal of 
Politics vol. 54 (4): 1055-73. 
Tenev S. (2003) “Informality and the Playing Field in Vietnam's Business Sector”, Mekong Project 
Development Facility. 
Tiebout, C. (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy vol. 64 (5): 
416-424. 
Treisman, D. (2002a) “Decentralization and the Quality of Government,” Mimeo, UCLA. 
Treisman,  D.  (2002b)  “Defining  and  Measuring  Decentralization:  A  Global  Perspective,”  Mimeo, 
UCLA. 
Tsai, L.L. (2002) “Cadres, Temple and Lineage Institutions, and Governance in Rural China,” The 
China Journal, vol. 48: 1-27. 
Voigt, S. (1993) "Values, Norms, Institutions, and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, vol.4(4):495-529.  
Voigt,  S.  and  D.  Kiwit  (1998)  “The  Role  and  Evolution  of  Beliefs,  Habits,  Moral  Norms,  and 
Institutions,” appeared in: Herbert Giersch (Ed.) “The Merits of Markets - Critical Issues of the 
Open Society,” Berlin et al.: Springer, 83-108.  
Vu, T.T.A., Le V.T., and T.T. Vo (2007) “Provincial Extralegal Investment Incentives in the Context 
of Decentralization in Vietnam: Mutually Beneficial or a Race to the Bottom?” Working paper.  
Williamson,  C.  (2009)  “Informal  Institutions  Rule:  Institutional  Arrangements  and  Economic 
Performance, Public Choice, vol. 139(3-4): 371-387. 
World Bank (2005) “East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work,” the World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Yilmaz,  S.S.  and  R.D.  Ebel  (2002)  “On  Measurement  and  Impact  of  Fiscal  Decentralization,” 
Washington D.C, World Bank. 
Zellner,  A.  and  H.  Theil  (1962)  “Three-Stage  Least  Squares:  Simultaneous  Estimation  of 
Simultaneous Equations," Econometrica, vol.30(1): 54-78. 
Zenger,  T.R.,  Lazzarini,  S.G.,  and  P.  Laura  (2002)  “Informal  and  Formal  Organization  in  New 
Institutional Economics,” in Paul Ingram and Brian S. Silverman (ed.) The New Institutionalism 
in  Strategic  Management:  Advances  in  Strategic  Management,  Emerald  Group  Publishing 
Limited, vol. 19: 277-305. 
 
 
 